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This paper aims at a better understanding of the factors influencing the decision of young 
graduates who entered teaching to stay in that profession. The field of research covers 
secondary education teachers in the French-Speaking Community of Belgium. The data 
analysed comes from an administrative database containing historical records of 50,000 
individuals who started teaching between 1973 and 1996. The analysis is carried out assuming 
a proportional hazard model and using the discrete-time method initiated by Prentice and 
Gloecker (1978). One of the main results is that the risk of exit is dramatically more important 
during the first periods of employment. That this risk tends also to increase over time 
suggesting that drop-out among young recruits is higher now than it was in the past. Location 
and labour market conditions seem to be of little impact. The risk of exit is the same in rural 
and urban areas and across provinces wherein unemployment rates vary dramatically. Finally, 
the significant deterioration of pay conditions (in relative terms) since the mid-80's has had no 
significant impact on the risk of exit. Of greater importance are supply-side (organisational) 
elements like the level of centralisation of recruitment decisions or the level of asymmetry 
between tenure and non-tenure personnel regarding job protection, access to full-time 
position… 
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Teachers form, with pupils, one of the essential ingredients of an educational system's 
functioning. Yet, and this might seem a bit paradoxical, very few empirical studies are 
devoted to them. Our knowledge of the European Labour Market for Teachers is insufficient 
and our understanding of their career path is limited in scope. This is particularly true of the 
French-Speaking Community of Belgium. We know with great accuracy the number of 
teachers in activity. We have a rather good idea of age pyramids or gender distribution, but 
we know almost nothing about the factors influencing the decision to opt for teaching instead 
of other sectors of activity (banking, insurance, advertising...). The same is true of the 
determinants of the propensity to stay in teaching. The point is that these two processes are 
crucial determinants of the composition and the quality of the teaching work-force at a certain 
point in history. And both elements are apparently central to good education. Recent work 
(Hanushek, Kain & Rivkin,1998) on human capital production stresses the importance of 
'teachers' effects' and suggests that the quality of teachers could be more important than the 
quality of schools (i.e. the so-called 'school effects') in maximising pupils' academic 
prospects. 
 
What follows intends to improve our understanding of teaching careers. The exercise is 
empirical in essence. The material analysed here comes from administrative databases used to 
organise the payroll of secondary school teachers in the French-Speaking Community of 
Belgium. The main interest of this data resides in the fact that it enables us to follow the 
career of a very large number of individuals. This data does not help us understand the choice 
made by graduates when entering the teaching profession: it should be clear that all the results 
presented here are conditional on entry. Similarly, the data set contains no information about 
the destination of the teachers in case of exit. But despite all these restrictions and limitations, 
this data is adequate to answer the question of who stays in teaching and why. The results 
presented here suggest that this question is important and should be addressed by those in 
charge of education policy. 
 
From a methodological standpoint, results presented and commented here are based on 
duration analysis (Lancaster, 1990). Duration models are aimed at identifying the 
determinants of the probability for an individual to move from one status to another (e.g. from 
life to death, from unemployment to employment...) after a certain period of time. The typical 
dependent variable of duration models is the time spent by individuals in a certain situation. 
Variables characterising the individual, his/her context and the policy he/she has benefited 
from are the most frequent independent variables used in duration analysis (Allison, 1997). 
  2Historically, these models were developed in the medical sector to assess the impact of some 
molecules or treatments in terms of improved survival prospects. More recently, these models 
have been applied in labour economics in order to analyse unemployment spells and their 
determinants (d'Addio, 1998; Dejemeppe, 1997), in particular the efficiency of some training 
programs. In the field of Economics of Education, their use is even more recent. The first 
example of their systematic use is by Dolton & van der Klaauw (1995) and Murnane (1991). 
The focus is similar to ours: these authors are concerned with the determinants of the 
probability of exit among teachers in the UK and US primary and secondary school systems. 
 
1. Presentation of the educational system of the French-Speaking 
Community of Belgium 
 
Like many educational systems in Europe, the secondary school system in the French-
Speaking Community of Belgium is financed by public money. Teachers get paid by the 
central administration following uniform salary scales relating teachers' wages to diploma and 
seniority. This principle is applicable to teachers working in public schools (i.e. those directly 
ruled by the Ministry of Education, by the Provincial Authority or by the local Municipal 
Authority) but also for those working for independent Catholic affiliated school boards
2. Yet, 
depending on the authority from which schools depend, some aspects of the decision-making 
process — typically hiring decisions — are more or less centralised. Independent Catholic 
boards generally delegate the responsibility for hiring teachers to school principals, but that 
responsibility is much more centralised in public schools, especially those directly operated 
by the Ministry of Education.  
 
Another central component of the policy towards teachers worth mentioning here relates to 
tenure. Like in most Western educational systems, access to tenure
3  is actually based on 
seniority. This policy a priori limits professional mobility among teachers after a certain 
number of years. But its logical corollary, ceteris paribus, should be a higher exit rate among 
(young) teachers without tenure. From the employer's side one can say that the last-in-first-out 
rule prevails. During periods of budgetary austerity or demographic downturn — generally 
synonymous with job cuts — non-tenure teachers are always the first to be asked to go. In 
public ministerial schools, non-tenure teachers can also be pushed out by senior colleagues 
using their right to geographical relocation. Finally, the prevailing quasi-market principle, 
synonymous with free school choice and per-pupil financing (Vandenberghe, 1998), can also 
reinforce the asymmetry between tenure and non-tenure staff members. On the quasi-market, 
                                                 
2 Representing approximately 50% of the system. 
3 And the right to benefit from the generous public pension system. 
  3even if the total number of jobs is constant system-wide, some schools can experience 
dramatic year-to-year enrolment falls. And the cost of those micro-level shifts is likely to be 
primarily borne by those with a shorter history within the system. 
2. Data  
 
Our data set contains information about teachers who worked in secondary schools in the 
French-Speaking Community of Belgium between 1972 and 1997. It consists of an 
administrative file containing the list of teachers on the payroll on the 15th of January of each 
year. We possess payment records for 113,218 teachers who worked in a secondary school for 
periods (duration) ranging from 1 year or less to 25 years. These periods are measured 
discretely, by intervals of 1 year. All these teachers have not been retained here. A double 
restriction has been imposed. Were taken out of the reference set : (1) teachers who were 
already in the system in 1972 (source of left-hand censoring)
4 (2) observations corresponding 
to the 1997-1998 interval
5. This triple restriction led to a reduced total of 50,041 teachers with 
a majority of women (56.30%). 
 
For each of these individuals we have as many rows (spells) as years in total duration. This 
means t rows for a person who spent t years in the system. This information helps us build the 
dependant variable of the model, i.e. a variable indicating if the teacher is still present or not 
at the end of the year t. Besides, payment records contain all sorts of additional information 
forming the set of explanatory variables we can use to explain the propensity of individuals to 
quit the system. There are variables describing each teacher's socio-demographic profile 
(gender, age...), the context of his/her school (location of the school, the governance regime...) 
and his/her working conditions (number of schools attended, weekly timetable, wage). 
 
Given the specificity of female career paths, data presentation and analysis carried out here 
systematically distinguish males and females. The latter (56.30%) slightly outnumber the 
former (43.70%). For men, the observed exit rate is 50.5% while it reaches 49.9% for their 
female colleagues. 
 
                                                 
4 One could, for those subjects, measure the length of their stay within the system from the moment our 
observation starts, but this measure would underestimate the total and effective length of their stay. One exit 
after a relatively short observed period of time might in fact correspond to a relatively long stay in the system; 
one that started a long time before 1972 for example. 
5 The 15th of January 1997 being the last point of observation, we a priori ignore what occurred beyond that 
point. It is thus totally impossible to analyse the risk of exit during that interval. To avoid what one calls 'right 
censoring' we consequently eliminate all observations made on that date, and that includes individuals who 
entered into the system in 1997. 
  4The first variable describes the age of entering for the first time in teaching (AGE_S). It 
should be considered as a proxy for the level of qualification in terms of final degree or 
previous professional experience: the older the new teacher, the higher is his qualification. 
Table 1 shows that it is on average slightly higher for male teachers (30.89 years old) than for 
female ones (28.87 years old) therefore suggesting gender-based qualification differentials. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The second group of variables reflects the working conditions of the teacher. Table 1 suggests 
that the average weekly workload (WLOAD) is relatively high for men (94% of the fulltime 
reference), but also for women (90%). We also measure the dispersion of this timetable 
between one or several establishments (NSCHOOL). It is superior to unity for both men 
(1.13) and women (1.15), this last figure suggesting that women get slightly less comfortable 
working conditions. Then comes the number of provinces in which they work (NPROV) 
acting as a proxy of the distance between the different schools the teacher works in. Table 1 
reveals that most teachers work within the same province (average number of provinces=1). 
 
In the same group of variables we have also introduced a variable capturing the cumulated 
wage increment teachers have benefited from since their entrance (ISAL). This variable 
strongly reflects the variability of the wage policy over the last 25 years illustrated by Figure 
3. Referring to Table 1, we notice that on average salary progression observed is 65% for men 
and 69% for women, but that deviation is high especially for women. 
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
Then come variables that are likely to capture local and historical contextual conditions. The 
unemployment rate in the province (LOGUN) is likely to reflect the impact of the state of the 
(external) labour market. The dummy variables for the province in which the school is located 
(PROV) should enable us to capture other influences of the local socio-economic context. In 
that group of contextual factors, we have also included the level of employment in the 
educational system (LNEMPL) which is likely to capture the tightness of the (internal) labour 
market for teachers. One could indeed assume that the larger this market, the more easy it is 
for young teachers to stay in the system. We introduce that variable also because the labour 
market for teachers might be very specific and segmented from other sectors of the labour 
market. We have finally introduced the calendar date (CAL) — not to confuse with the 
duration variable (DUR). This variable should seize the impact of any other determinant of 
the risk of exit, at any moment in the history of the system, not captured by the previous 
variables. 
  5 
Finally, there is a categorical variable corresponding to the so-called 'réseau' to which the 
school belongs (RES). As mentioned in section 2, schools can be ruled directly by the 
Ministry of Education (RES=MIN), by the Provincial Authority (RES=PROV), by the local, 
Municipal Authority (RES=MUN) or by independent Catholic affiliated boards (RES=CAT).  
 
3. Descriptive analysis: probability (cumulated and 
instantaneous) of leaving teaching 
 
It is convenient and useful to start with a descriptive analysis of the careers of the 50,041 
teachers who entered the system at some point between 1973 and 1996. Figure 1 displays the 
survival curve (Kaplan-Meier Estimate), which measures the (cumulative) probability of 
staying within the system until the beginning of interval (year) k or later. 
 
Algebraically, this probability corresponds to the product of conditional survival probabilities 
up to the beginning of interval t=1...k (equation 1). This can be written as the product over 
t=1...k of (1- qt), qt being the probability of exit during interval t. Following the LIFETABLE 
method used here, qt results from the division of dt (the number of teachers leaving during 
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Looking at the results now (Figure 1), one can see that the (cumulated) survival rate at a 10 
year horizon (k=10) is of 55% for men and 53% for women. After 24 years this figure has 
declined to 39% for men and 42% for women. The well-known tendency of the profession to 
feminize (Vandenberghe, 1996) does seem to been imputable to the fact that the system 
cannot retain as many male teachers over the long run. 
 
These rates might appear to be relatively high in absolute terms but their are comparable to 
those describing the situation in the UK or in the US. Stinebrickner (1997), reporting on his 
analysis of a sample of primary and secondary education teachers in the US, mentions a 
                                                 
6 Note that half the individuals still there on the 15th January 1997 while beginning their year ( 2 t w ) — right-
censored individuals — come in deduction of the total number of individuals at risk (nt). The justification for this 
is that the method treats censored cases as if they were censored at the midpoint of the interval and consequently 
out of the 'at-risk' population beyond that midpoint. 
  6survival probability of less that 40% at a 7 year time horizon suggesting a higher cumulated 
exit rate. By contrast, Dolton & van der Klaauw (1995), analysing the situation in the UK, 
observed a survival rate of 66% after 5 years of teaching. The corresponding figure we obtain 
for the French-Speaking Community of Belgium is of 60% for male teachers and 58% for 
their female colleagues.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Figure 2 usefully complements the survival function. It shows the hazard function which 
describes the instantaneous probability of exit during interval k. Analytically, hazard rate h(k) 
is obtained by dividing the number of teachers who left during that interval (dk) by the sum of 
individual-time-units of exposure to the risk of exit (equation 2). As the unit of time used here 
is unitary (1 year), total exposure time to risk is simply equal to the total number of 
individuals present at the beginning of interval (nk), minus half the number of censored 
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One can figure out, by looking at Figure 2, the extent to which the risk of exit is important 
during the early years of teachers' careers. It is extraordinarily high during the first year, then 
drops regularly to reach a low and relatively constant level beyond year 7, suggesting that 
instability is essentially concentrated on newcomers, and that there is almost no career 
mobility once some seniority has been acquired. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
                                                 
7 Still supposing that exit or censoring occurs at the midpoint of the interval 
  74. Multivariate analysis 
 
The next stage logically consists of trying to identify the factors influencing the hazard rate of 
teachers: i.e. carrying out a multivariate analysis of the probability of exit. The instrument is a 
duration model. We have opted here for a semi-parametric continuous time model that we 
estimate by using per interval (1 year) grouped data. This preference for a continuous time 
model echoes our concern not to exclude a priori the possibility of duration (total time spent 
in teaching) being a continuous rather than a discrete value. 
 
4.1. Prentice and Gloecker model and complementary log-log 
transformation 
a. Presentation of the model 
 
We assume, following Cockx (1997), a set of i=1…N individuals (graduates) that entered the 
teaching profession at some point between 1973
8 and 1996. Suppose that the information 
gathered about these individuals is grouped in K intervals of equal length
9): 
[0,1[;[1,2[;[2,3[…[K-1,K[. For each individual, we know the interval during which he/she 
left teaching (if relevant): k-1≤t< k, with t designating the occurrence of the random 
variable T. 
 
If for the underlying continuous time model we note the hazard function
10 in t by h(t), we 
have by definition
11 that the survival function
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If we now consider the probability of exit during an interval Pk — i.e. the discrete version of 
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8 Teachers already present in the system in 1972 are not considered in order to avoid left-censoring problems. 
9 Which is precisely the case in our data set (see above). 
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being the cumulative function and f(t) the probability distribution. 
11 See for example Greene (1993), page 717-178 for a demonstration of this. 
12 S(t)=Pr(T=t)=1-F(t) 
  8where the right-hand term of the last expression directly stems from equation 3. 
 
If Xi(t) designates a vector of independent variables characterising individual i in t and if we 
assume that the hazard function is proportional and semi-parametric (Prentice & Gloecker, 
1978), we have: 
 
() β ) ( exp ) ( ) ( 0 ′ = t X t h t h i i  [5] 
 
where β  is the vector of unknown parameters to be estimated and h0(t) the baseline hazard 
common to all individuals i=1...N. Using this specification and assuming that variables Xi(t) 
take values that remain unchanged within interval k, one can now express the probability that 
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It is worth observing that expression 7 links a linear expression to a variable taking values 
ranging from 0 to 1, meaning that this model belongs to the class of Generalised Linear 
Models. The inverse function, generally called the complementary log-log function, takes the 
following form. 
 
( ) ( 1 ln( ln ) ( ) ( k P k k X i i − − = + ′ ) γ β  [9] 
 
b. Estimation of the model by maximum of likelihood 
 
The next step is to estimate the parameters of expression 9 by maximum of likelihood. A 
natural starting point is the standard expression of likelihood commonly used in duration 
analysis (expression 10). The basic information used for estimation of most duration models 
consists of the total length of stay within a certain status. Here, the equivalent is the total time 
  9spent by an individual in teaching, measured by the last interval in which he was 
observed (ki). The dichotomy variable in expression 10 indicates whether there is right-
censoring ( 0 = i δ ) or not ( 1 = i δ ) for individual i. The first term of the right-hand part of 
equation 10 represents the probability of exit during interval ki and the second term the 
probability that exit occurs at a later stage. 
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But the basic information contained in our data set is not the total length of stay of 
individual i. Duration is in fact decomposed in sub-periods of equal length. Remember that 
we have t rows for a person who spent t years in the system. Meyer (1990) and Allison (1982, 
1997) propose, in this case, to re-write the likelihood expression 10. Their basic idea is that 
the probability for individual i to leave the system during interval ki is the product of the 
hazard rate (in its discrete version) specific to that interval by the cumulative probability of 
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and if one adopts the convention that  ik λ  equals to 1 if individual i leaves teaching during 


































)  [14] 
 
  10The last thing we need to do is to introduce the specification of the hazard function (in its 
discrete formulation) Pi(k)(equation 7) to get a likelihood expression function of unknown 
parameters  ) (k γ  and β . 
 
It is important to note that this expression 14 is equivalent to the likelihood function of a 
regression model in which the dependent variable is binary ( ik λ  to 0 or 1 here); model that 
can be estimated using common software packages such as SAS, STATA or SPSS
13. The 
estimation of these parameters then follows along the usual algorithm of likelihood 
maximisation. A last point worth noting it that the estimated parameter β
)
 corresponds to the 
parameter of the exponential semi-parametric Cox function and should be interpreted in the 
same way, i.e. in terms of relative hazard rates. For expression 5 the ratio between the hazard 




c. Unobserved heterogeneity 
 
The proportional hazard rate model used here is very practical in a sense because it 
immediately delivers an indication of the dependency to duration (be it with a parametric or 
non parametric specification of h0(t) in expression 5). This information is important for policy 
making. A strong negative dependence to duration suggests that the first months exert a 
critical impact on young graduates' commitment to the educational sector, while a positive 
dependence to duration indicates the presence of burnout problems at later stages in the 
career. Each case requires specific answers and measures. Hence, getting access to unbiased 
coefficients for duration dependence is essential.  
 
To avoid biases, we inevitably have to envisage the presence of unobserved heterogeneity 
among individuals. It seems reasonable to assume that some young teachers are highly 
motivated by their job and want to spend their whole life in the same job. Others, by contrast, 
are probably unmotivated and consider their current teaching activity as temporary. They 
stick to that position until something more appealing becomes available in other segments of 
the labour market. 
 
To understand the sort of bias unobserved heterogeneity potentially creates, let us assume that 
50% of entrants are highly motivated and that the other 50% are not motivated at all. The first 
group has a (unobservable) risk of exit of 0% while the second group is characterised by a 
risk of 100%. By confounding the two groups as we have done so far, we will measure a risk 
of exit of about 50% during period 1 and of 0% during the following periods. The (false) 
                                                 
13 In SAS in particular, one can use the PROBIT procedure, provided one indicates that the relation between the 
discrete hazard term (Pi(k) and the linear equation is of the complementary log-log type 
  11conclusion we would draw from these observations would be that every individual surviving 
the first year is likely to stay indefinitely in the educational sector. The (inadequate) policy 
recommendation would be to re-deploy human resources policies in favour of entrants and 
pay more attention to what happens during their first year of activity. 
 
In more analytical terms, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity leads to over-estimated 
(underestimated) coefficients for negative (positive) duration dependence. Lancaster (1990) 
demonstrates that the coefficient of the other variables Xi(k) can be biased too. 
 
To remedy this problem, following Liang & Zeger (1986), we introduce into the hazard rate 
function an additive factor  i ν representing the heterogeneity component for which we assume 
a normal (Gaussian) distribution,  . Coefficients to estimate now include the (unique) 
parameter of the normal function i.e. the variance  . This can be achieved in STATA 
version 6 using the xtclog command (STATA, 1999). The higher the estimated variance of 





i ν  , 
the more serious the presumption of unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
  124.2. Results 
 
a.  Comparison of the estimated models.  
 
The first explanatory variable examined here is the number of years spent in the system 
(DUR)
14. The estimated parameter for this variable corresponds to the term  ) (k γ  in 
equation 9. The other explanatory variables retained here and presented in section 2 
correspond to   in the same equation. But before moving to the results per se, it is worth 
discussing the way to model the relationship between hazard and duration (i.e. the 
specification of the baseline hazard function). It is rather common to assume that the baseline 
hazard corresponds to Weibull function (
) ( ′ k X i
) ln( ) ( 0 t t h α ≡ ) with a unique parameter α reflecting 
the sign of duration dependence. The alternative consists of using a non-parametric model 
(actually a series of dummies for the different values of the duration variable). Both models 
have been estimated here. Yet, Table 2 and the likelihood ratio test
15 it contains, let us believe 
that the non parametric model for baseline hazard significantly improves the model fit. 
Although coefficients have been systematically reported for the Weibull model in Tables 4.1 
& 4.2, we shall concentrate hereafter on the results of the non-parametric model (Tables 3.1, 
3.2 & 3.3). 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
a.  Negative dependence to duration, especially for women.  
 
Table 3.1 (columns 1 & 2) clearly shows that there is a negative dependence of the risk of exit 
to duration. This result confirms what was already visible in Figure 2 above : the instability is 
much higher at the very early stage of the career than after a certain number of years. In 
column 1, the highest (significant) coefficient for the categorical variable DUR corresponds to 
the first year of the career. Given the proportional hazard model used here (equation 9), an 
estimated coefficient exp(γ ) )=6.99 for men means that the risk of exit for a male teacher in his 
first year is almost 7 times higher than that for his 24
th year of activity. This ratio decreases 
sharply up to a point (approximately the 8
th year). The situation of women in their first years 
seems to be even more unstable than when they have a long history within the system. 
Compared to female teachers it their 24
th year, those in their first year show a risk of exit 
23.07 times higher. This suggests a higher negative dependence to duration among women. 
                                                 
14 Remember that the value taken by DUR represents the number of intervals starting the 15th of January of one 
year and finishing at the same date one year later. 
15 The likelihood ratio is computed as 2 times the difference of the log-likelihood of the models to be compared. 
It follows a  with p degree of freedom, where p is the number of additionally included variables (23 here). 
2 χ
  13 
This result of negative dependence to duration is also visible in Table 4.1 (see Appendix) in 
which we used a parametric approach to estimate the baseline hazard. The specification 
retained is  ) ln( ) ( 0 t t h α ≡  generating a Weibull model [ ] in which the sign 
of the estimated parameter 
) exp( ) ( β
α X t t h ′ =
α )  directly measures the negative or positive dependence to 
duration. In columns 1 & 2,  ) exp(α )  is clearly inferior to 1 (which means that α )  is negative) 
and statistically significant.  
 
The robustness of the negative duration dependence is confirmed by the coefficients of the 
model with unobserved heterogeneity (columns 3 & 4 in Table 3.1). The differences with the 
first set of coefficients are negligible. This is no surprise if we refer to the statistics displayed 
at the bottom of Table 3.3. The estimated value for the variance of the Gaussian distributed 
unobserved heterogeneity term is almost nil (ln =0.00). The absence of significant 
unobserved heterogeneity is confirmed by the likelihood ratio tests. Bias caused by 




Broadly speaking, the observation of negative dependence to duration is well in line with a 
central component of the policy in place for many decades now in education: access to tenure 
solely based on seniority. This policy tends to limit dramatically professional mobility among 
teachers after a certain number of years, but its corollary is that the turnover is particularly 
high among young teachers. 
 
b.  Increased hazard rates over(calendar) time.  
 
The second interesting result visible in Table 3.2 concerns the impact of the calendar date 
(CAL) at which exit takes place. The coefficient of the different values taken by this variable 
represents the ratio between the risk of exit for the particular year considered (e.g. 1973) and 
the year of reference (1996 here). The general tendency over the last 25 years for both men 
and women was a rising probability of exit at a certain point of the career. Ceteris paribus, the 
risk was much lower in 1974 et 1975 than it was in 1996, as suggested by the value of 
exp(β
)
) significantly inferior to 1 in Table 3.2. For both men and women, the hazard rate rose 
gradually between 1976 and 1986-87. It then decreased a little without recovering its early 
1970's values but then rose again to reach its climax during the interval starting on January 
15th 1996.  
 
Insert Tables 3.1, 3.2 & 3.3 about here 
 
  14c.  No significant effect of starting age 
 
Referring now to socio-demographic variables in Table 3.3, one observes that starting age 
(AGE_S) has no significant impact on the risk of exit. This result seems to suggest the 
absence of difference between individuals who graduated from university or non-university 
tertiary education.  
 
d.  Significant but (very) small effect of wage progression on risk of exit, for men only 
 
One of the most interesting results in Table 3.3 is to observe that the wage policy of the last 
15 years (ISAL) — leading to a relative deterioration of teachers' purchasing power as 
suggested by Figure 3 — has had no significant impact on the probability of exit of women. 
The coefficient is significant for men, but very small in magnitude: a 10 points additional 
wage premium
16 would reduce their hazard rate by 1.1 percent. 
 
e.  Part-time work increases hazard rates dramatically 
  
By contrast, the variable describing the teachers' weekly timetable (WLOAD) is significant 
and of higher magnitude, particularly for men. The higher the number of periods taught 
weekly, the lower the risk of leaving teaching (Table 3.3). A male teacher increasing his 
weekly workload by 10 points reduces his risk of exit by 7.7%.That percentage if of 7.1% for 
their female peers.  
 
f.  Working in several schools reduces risk of exit 
 
More surprisingly perhaps, working in several schools rather than one (NSCHOOL) is a 
significant source of reduction of the risk of exit (Table 3.3). The drop is of about 26% for 
men working in two schools vs. men teaching in a single school. The reduction is of 30% for 
women. Finally, distance between schools, as approximated here by the number of provinces 
in which the teacher is active (NPROV), seems to reduce the risk of exit of women by 40%. 
Yet, this result should be used carefully as descriptive statistics displayed in Table 1 indicate 
that the average number of provinces of work is very close to unity. 
 
                                                 
16 That premium is, on average, of 60%. See bottom of Table 1. 
  15g.  No incidence of outside and inside labour market conditions but lower hazard in some 
provinces 
 
Although this result might reflex poor quality of data, it is surprising to observe in Table 3.3 
that labour market conditions — both external and internal ones — do not help us understand 
the exit patterns. Teaching employment opportunities estimated by the log of the employment 
(LNEMPL) level appear insignificant in all regressions. For men, the same is true for the 
overall unemployment rate (LOGUN) of the province. The positive and significant coefficient 
of this variable for female teachers (1.29) is puzzling: a higher unemployment rate in the 
province tends to increase the hazard rate of women, which goes against the idea that a lower 
'opportunity cost' should lead to a lower turnover in the teaching sector. 
 
Beyond these dimensions, the province where the school is located (PROV) and all the other 
contextual elements that are linked to that dummy seem globally insignificant. Some 
exceptions deserves attention however. First the province of Hainaut. Its coefficients of 0.90 
(for men) or 0.86 (for women) suggesting indeed that teachers working there have had a lower 
propensity to leave teaching, but for reasons that are not strongly related to the unemployment 
rate. By contrast, but for men only, the province of Luxembourg is synonymous of higher risk 
of exit. 
 
h.  A higher risk of exit when decision-making is more centralised 
 
Finally, the variable describing the so-called 'réseau' (RES) to which the school is affiliated is 
highly significant. We know that organisational parameters vary along this line. For example, 
human resources management is more centralised in the schools directly ruled by the Ministry 
of Education (RES=MIN).The coefficients of Table 3.3 suggest that this might be of some 
importance in explaining the risk of leaving teaching. That risk is significantly lower in 
schools ruled by local authorities (RES=PROV or MUN) and subsidised Catholic schools 
(RES=CAT). Using the most centralised component of the system as a reference (MIN), one 
observes in Table 2.3 that the risk of departure is up to 46% lower (for women) in schools 




Results presented here strongly support the idea that a good understanding of teachers' 
propensity to leave teaching is necessary to develop sound educational policies. Previous 
work on human capital production functions suggests that 'teachers matter' (Hanushek, Kain 
& Rivkin,1998) and, further, that the characteristics of teachers could be more important than 
  16the quality of schools in maximising pupils' academic prospects. Following this approach 
most observers and decision-makers usually focus on initial training and recruitment 
processes to influence the profile of the teaching body. Our analysis of secondary school 
teachers in the French-Speaking Community of Belgium strongly suggests that this approach 
might be insufficient. The likelihood of exit among young teachers can indeed be very high.  
 
The actual profile of the teaching body is likely to be strongly influenced by the selection 
process that takes place at the beginning of the career. This conclusion is well in line with that 
of other research carried out in the UK for example (Dolton & van der Klaauw, 1995). A 
better understanding of the determinants of exit could lead to more effective policies aimed at 
reducing teacher turnover in shortage subjects or schools. In budgetary terms, more 
investment in teachers' initial training makes little sense if simultaneously turnover among 
young teachers remains high or keeps rising as suggested by our results. 
 
Contrary to those of Dolton & van der Klaauw (1995), our results do not strongly support the 
idea that wage policies primarily affect teachers' turnover. Their might be an impact of wage 
progression rates on the decision of male teachers to stay, but of very small magnitude. Given 
our results, a more credible assumption would be that non-monetary working conditions 
matter. Access to a full-time teaching job dramatically reduces the risk of exit. Another 
central result is simply the strong negative dependence to duration. The risk of exit is 
dramatically more important during the first years of presence and becomes dramatically low 
at latter stages of the career, despite potential burnout. We interpret this fact as the logical 
consequence of both a last-in-first-out principle and an access to tenure solely based on 
seniority. These elements a priori limit professional mobility among older teachers. But its 
corollary seems to be a higher exit rate among (young) teachers without tenure. Increased 
hazard rates over(calendar) time observed in this research could simply be the consequence of 
a growing proportion of tenure teachers in the system, shifting the whole cost of flexibility the 
system needs on the newcomers.  
 
Finally, the prevailing quasi-market of the French-Speaking Community of Belgium can also 
reinforce the asymmetry between tenure and non-tenure staff members. On the quasi-market 
with tenure based on seniority, the cost of inter-school shifts of market shares is primarily 
borne by those with a shorter history within the system. A tendency of greater use of school 
choice opportunities by pupils and families, already identified by sociologists in the 70's 
(Billet, 1977), could thus also explain a rising turnover. 
  17Appendix 
 
Insert Tables 4.1 & 4.2 here  
  18Figure 1 — Survival function in the secondary education system. Breakdown by gender. 















  19Figure 2 — Hazard rates according to duration in the secondary education system. 














  20Figure 3 — Consumption price index and nominal wage evolution for secondary school 
teachers. French-Speaking Community of Belgium. Period 1972-1997. PRICE= consumption 


































































  21Table 1 – Descriptive statistics about the data set 
 
 Men  Women  Total 
Number of individuals  21,869  28,172  50,041 
% individuals  43.70  56.30  100.00 
Number of exits (individuals)  11,165  14,191   
Number of right censoring 
(individuals) 
10,946 14,247   
% of exit (individuals)  50.50  49.90   
Number of spells (years)  191,938  236,963   
Number of exits (spells)  11,165  14,247   
Number of right censoring (spells)  183,758  225,532   
% exit (spells)  5.73  5.94   
Average number of spells (years)*  8.78  8.41   





Average weekly workload 






Average number of schools of 






Average number of provinces of 






Average maximal salary 
progression : ISAL 






* Standard deviation in brackets 
  22Table 2 – Likelihood ratio tests (1)  
 
 Men  Women 
Non_Para/Weibull  
2





Non_Para/Weibull with Unobs. Hetero. 
2







Weibull)]  where p is equal to the number of additionally included variables (23 dummies for 
duration here); testing H
2
p χ ≅
0 i.e. the unconstrained model (i.e. non-parametric baseline hazard) does not improve 
the fit relative to the Weibull specification,  
(2)  35.172 = % 5
2
23 at χ




  Unobserved  heterogeneity 
Variable 
Men   Women  Men   Women 
DUR =1  6.99*[0.24]  23.07* [0.26] 6.99* [0.22]  23.07* [0.25]
2  3.22*[0.24]  10.09* [0.26] 3.22* [0.22]  10.10* [0.25]
3  1.74*[0.24]  6.09* [0.26] 1.74* [0.22]  6.09* [0.25] 
4  1.07 [0.24]  3.67* [0.26] 1.07  [0.22]  3.67* [0.25] 
5  0.90 [0.24]  2.38* [0.27] 0.90  [0.22]  2.38* [0.25] 
6  0.71 [0.24]  1.86* [0.27] 0.71  [0.22]  1.86* [0.26] 
7  0.61*[0.24]  1.62  [0.27] 0.61* [0.22]  1.62  [0.26] 
8  0.55*[0.25]  1.18  [0.27] 0.55* [0.22]  1.18  [0.26] 
9  0.56*[0.25]  1.10  [0.27] 0.56* [0.22]  1.10  [0.26] 
10  0.51*[0.25]  1.23  [0.27] 0.51* [0.23]  1.23  [0.26] 
11  0.59*[0.25]  1.19  [0.27] 0.59* [0.23]  1.19  [0.26] 
12  0.47*[0.25]  1.04  [0.28] 0.47* [0.23]  1.04  [0.26] 
13  0.47*[0.25]  1.02  [0.28] 0.47* [0.23]  1.02  [0.27] 
14  0.52*[0.25]  0.98  [0.28] 0.52* [0.23]  0.98  [0.27] 
15  0.60*[0.25]  1.11  [0.28] 0.60* [0.23]  1.11  [0.27] 
16  0.60*[0.25]  1.09  [0.28] 0.60* [0.23]  1.09  [0.27] 
17  0.65*[0.25]  1.20  [0.28] 0.65  [0.23]  1.20  [0.27] 
18  0.84 [0.25]  1.13  [0.28] 0.84  [0.23]  1.13  [0.27] 
19  0.62 [0.25]  1.04  [0.28] 0.62* [0.24]  1.04  [0.27] 
20  0.83 [0.25]  0.89  [0.28] 0.83  [0.23]  0.89  [0.27] 
21  0.79 [0.25]  1.12  [0.29] 0.79  [0.24]  1.12  [0.28] 
22  0.75 [0.27]  0.80  [0.31] 0.75  [0.25]  0.80  [0.30] 
23  1.26 [0.27]  1.21  [0.32] 1.26  [0.25]  1.21  [0.31] 
Ref=24  1.00   1.00   1.00   1.00 
*denotes significant difference from zero at 5% level 




  Unobserved  heterogeneity 
Variable 
Men Women    Men Women 
CAL=1973  0.65 [1.67]  0.10* [0.13] 0.65  [6.23]  - 
1974  0.14 [1.40]  0.03* [0.42] 0.14  [5.15]  0.01* [0.41] 
1975  0.03*[0.95]  0.02* [0.42] 0.03  [3.30]  0.01* [0.41] 
1976  0.03*[0.53]  0.37* [0.26] 0.03  [1.78]  0.01* [0.25] 
1977  0.49*[0.12]  0.41* [0.08] 0.49  [0.37]  0.32* [0.06] 
1978  0.48*[0.07]  0.41* [0.06] 0.48* [0.14]  0.39* [0.05] 
1979  0.52*[0.06]  0.52* [0.06] 0.52* [0.05]  0.41* [0.05] 
1980  0.58*[0.07]  0.41* [0.06] 0.58* [0.15]  0.55* [0.05] 
1981  0.47*[0.08]  0.55* [0.06] 0.47* [0.21]  0.44* [0.05] 
1982  0.67*[0.09]  0.51* [0.05] 0.67  [0.25]  0.61* [0.04] 
1983  0.69*[0.06]  0.52* [0.05] 0.69* [0.05]  0.51* [0.05] 
1984  0.66*[0.06]  0.51* [0.05] 0.66* [0.05]  0.52* [0.04] 
1985  0.69*[0.06]  0.65* [0.05] 0.69* [0.05]  0.52* [0.04] 
1986  0.79*[0.06]  0.61* [0.05] 0.79* [0.05]  0.66* [0.04] 
1987  0.75*[0.06]  0.54* [0.05] 0.75* [0.12]  0.58* [0.04] 
1988  0.64*[0.08]  0.52* [0.06] 0.64* [0.22]  0.50* [0.05] 
1989  0.57*[0.07]  0.51* [0.05] 0.57* [0.18]  0.49* [0.04] 
1990  0.59*[0.06]  0.50* [0.05] 0.59* [0.09]  0.50* [0.04] 
1991  0.60*[0.06]  0.51* [0.05] 0.60* [0.05]  0.50* [0.04] 
1992  0.60*[0.06]  0.62* [0.05] 0.60* [0.10]  0.53* [0.04] 
1993  0.73*[0.07]  0.61* [0.04] 0.73  [0.17]  0.66* [0.04] 
1994  0.75*[0.06]  0.56* [0.05] 0.75* [0.06]  0.62* [0.04] 
1995  0.72*[0.05]  0.56* [0.05] 0.72* [0.05]  0.56* [0.04] 
Ref=1996  1.00   1.00  1.00   1.00  
*denotes significant difference from zero at 5% level 
  25Table 3.3 – Multivariate analysis estimates. Proportional Hazard Model: non-parametric 
baseline hazard  
 
exp(estimate) [S.E] 
  Unobserved  heterogeneity 
Variable 
Men Women Men Women 
AGE_S  1.01*[0.00]  1.00* [0.00] 1.01* [0.00]  1.00* [0.00] 
ISAL  0.89*[0.03]  0.98  [0.01] 0.89* [0.01]  0.98* [0.01] 
LOGUN  1.04  [0.03]  1.29* [0.09] 1.04  [0.03]  1.29* [0.07] 
LNEMPL  3.23  [0.93]  4.78  [0.00] 3.23  [3.49]  1.20* [0.06] 
NSCHOOL  0.74*[0.03]  0.70* [0.03] 0.74* [0.03]  0.70* [0.02] 
NPROV  0.98  [0.16]  0.59* [0.17] 0.98  [0.15]  0.59* [0.14] 
WLOAD 0.23*[0.03]  0.29*  [0.03] 0.23* [0.02]  0.29* [0.02] 
PROV=Brabant  1.06  [0.03]  1.06  [0.04] 1.06* [0.03]  1.06  [0.03] 
Hainaut  0.90* [0.03]  0.86* [0.04] 0.90* [0.03]  0.86* [0.03] 
Liège  1.05  [0.03]  0.96  [0.03] 1.05  [0.03]  0.96  [0.03] 
Luxemb  1.10*[0.04]  1.05  [0.04] 1.10* [0.04]  1.05  [0.04] 
Ref=Namur 1.00  1.00      1.00  1.00 
RES=MUN  0.65*[0.02]  0.54* [0.02] 0.65* [0.02]  0.54* [0.02] 
CAT  0.73*[0.04]  0.67* [0.03] 0.73* [0.03]  0,67* [0,03] 
PROV  0.66*[0.04]  0.57* [0.04] 0.66* [0.03]  0,57* [0,03] 
Ref=MIN 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Log-Likelihood -33,356.84  -40,500.13 -33,356.836  -40,500.13 
ln  
2
ν σ     0.00 [32,40]  0.00 [28,11] 
Likelihood ratio test of rho**=0;Prob > chi2 
= 
0.9892 0.9862 








σ ; which is the proportion of the total variance contributed by the unobserved heterogeneity 
component. 
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  Unobserved  heterogeneity 
Variable 
Men Women Men Women 
LNDUR   0.34* [0.01]  0.29* [0.00]  0.34* [0.01]  0.29* [0.01] 
CAL=1973  0.62  [1.71]  -  0.62  [5.95]  - 
1974  0.13  [1.43]  0.01* [0.00]  0.13  [4.92]  0.01* [0.41] 
1975  0.03* [0.97]  0.01* [0.00]  0.03  [3.15]  0.01* [0.41] 
1976  0.03* [0.54]  0.01* [0.00]  0.03* [1.70]  0.01* [0.25] 
1977  0.43* [0.12]  0.31* [0.00]  0.43* [0.36]  0.31* [0.06] 
1978  0.41* [0.07]  0.38* [0.00]  0.41* [0.13]  0.38* [0.05] 
1979  0.43* [0.06]  0.39* [0.00]  0.43* [0.05]  0.39* [0.05] 
1980  0.47* [0.07]  0.50* [0.00]  0.47* [0.14]  0.50* [0.05] 
1981  0.38* [0.08]  0.40* [0.00]  0.38* [0.20]  0.40* [0.05] 
1982  0.54* [0.09]  0.54* [0.00]  0.54* [0.24]  0.54* [0.04] 
1983  0.55* [0.06]  0.46* [0.00]  0.55* [0.05]  0.46* [0.05] 
1984  0.53* [0.06]  0.47* [0.00]  0.53* [0.05]  0.47* [0.04] 
1985  0.57* [0.06]  0.47* [0.00]  0.57* [0.05]  0.47* [0.04] 
1986  0.67* [0.06]  0.61* [0.00]  0.67* [0.05]  0.61* [0.04] 
1987  0.64* [0.07]  0.55* [0.00]  0.64* [0.12]  0.55* [0.04] 
1988  0.57* [0.08]  0.48* [0.00]  0.57* [0.21]  0.48* [0.05] 
1989  0.52* [0.07]  0.47* [0.00]  0.52* [0.17]  0.47* [0.04] 
1990  0.54* [0.06]  0.49* [0.00]  0.54* [0.09]  0.49* [0.04] 
1991  0.55* [0.06]  0.49* [0.00]  0.55* [0.05]  0.49* [0.04] 
1992  0.56* [0.06]  0.52* [0.00]  0.56* [0.09]  0.52* [0.04] 
1993  0.69* [0.07]  0.66* [0.00]  0.69* [0.17]  0.66* [0.04] 
1994  0.72* [0.06]  0.61* [0.00]  0.72* [0.06]  0.61* [0.04] 
1995  0.70* [0.05]  0.56* [0.00]  0.70* [0.05]  0.56* [0.04] 
Ref=1996  1.00    1.00    1.00    1.00 
*denotes significant difference from zero at 5% level 




  Unobserved  heterogeneity
Variable 
Men Women    Men  Women 
AGE_S  1.01* [0.00]  0.99* [0.00]  1.01* [0.00]  0.99* [0.00]
ISAL  1.03* [0.01]  1.00  [0.92]  1.03* [0.01]  1.00  [0.01] 
LOGUN  1.05  [0.03]  1.29* [0.00]  1.05  [0.03]  1.29* [0.07]
LNEMPL  3.26  [0.95]  1.22* [0.01]  3.26  [3.33]  1.22* [0.06]
NSCHOOL  0.73* [0.03]  0.70* [0.00]  0.73* [0.03]  0.70* [0.02]
NPROV  0.98  [0.16]  0.60* [0.00]  0.98  [0.15]  0.60* [0.14]
WLOAD  0.23* [0.03]  0.29* [0.00]  0.23* [0.02]  0.29* [0.02]
PROV=Brabant  1.05  [0.03]  1.06  [0.14]  1.05  [0.03]  1.06  [0.03] 
Hainaut  0.89* [0.03]  0.86* [0.00]  0.89* [0.03]  0.86* [0.03]
Liège  1.05  [0.03]  0.96  [0.20]  1.05  [0.03]  0.96  [0.03] 
Luxemb  1.10* [0.04]  1.05  [0.29]  1.10* [0.04]  1.05  [0.04] 
Ref=Namur  1.00    1.00    1.00    1.00   
RES=MUN  0.63* [0.02]  0.53* [0.00]  0.63* [0.02]  0.53* [0.02]
CAT  0.71* [0.04]  0.66* [0.00]  0.71* [0.03]  0.66* [0.03]
PROV  0.63* [0.04]  0.56* [0.00]  0.63* [0.03]  0.56* [0.03]
Ref=MIN 1.00      1.00  1.00  1.00 
Log-Likelohood -33,680.675  -40,653.66  -33,680.675  -40,653.659
ln  
2
ν σ     0.00 [34.07]  0.00 [28.77]
Likelihood ratio test of rho**=0;  













σ ; which is the proportion of the total variance contributed by the unobserved heterogeneity 
component. 
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